The author confronts the inner experience as it is described by psychoanalysis with the experience that cognitive science describes as informations processing. He arguments that the same events are described from two different vertices and that the two descriptions may be translated one in the other. We need to find out what are the internal informations that are processed in the unconscious affective experience which happens in relations. This may be possible if we can formulate a general theory about mind operating, which may consider psychoanalytic observations from a mnestic and communicational view point. The author underlines some difficulties owed to Freud's meta-psychology in the theorical tradition of psychoanalysis. Energetic and instinctual theory had an explicative purpose, beyond its clinic descriptive one, which tuned psychoanalysis with other contemporary sciences. That explicative value is not yet valid and postfreudian theories seem to disregard the "explication" aim. A theoretical void has secluded psychoanalysis from nowadays sciences of mind. The author considers how objectual theories may be developed and transformed to explore experience as learning, mnesic pathway, memory processing, and he proposes a "psychoanalytic cognitivism", by a personal explicative theory about mind development.

We are facing growing questioning nowadays concerning the efficacy of the psychoanalytic method in promoting a real humanization, in a social and cultural background progressively involved in the webs of virtual reality and globalization.
Nevertheless, if we carefully observe psychoanalytical development, we can see that virtuality has always been present in its course, as an intrinsic element to thought processes, or as an operational tool in the "transference neurosis". As a matter of fact, the reenactment of infantile conflicts in the transference scenery, that is, its repetition as Freud said, or its actualization, as we would say today, constitutes the central paradox of our method, something at the same time real and illusory.
And what affords that paradox? In my opinion, what we could call a "play spirit", acknowledged by Winnicott when he understands psychoanalysis as a highly developed form of play. So, it's necessary to deeply comprehend this "play factor", what I tried to do through Johan Huizinga's ideas, expounded in his wonderful essay "Homo Ludens - Play as a cultural element".
Trying to better understand our paradox, from an epistemological point of view, I introduce Deleuze's ideas concerning the actual and the virtual, and also Pierre Levy's concepts about virtual reality and collective intelligence.
Finally, understanding that psychoanalytical method is essentially framed to help the promotion of an actual and virtual humanization, I sketch a possible insertion of psychoanalysis in the Virtual Era.

The author starts the paper by commenting the question of truth in psychoanalysis, such as an epistemologic construction that aims the apprehension of the psychic reality of the subject, as well as to the feeling of being genuine, to exist as a subject with self desire. He understands from Bion and Winnicott contributions that the apprehension of psychic reality, as well as the genuineness of the sentiment of being, are built on intersubjectivity. The other, as object, has a fundamental structure role. It is studied how through the new technologic, especially virtuality, can interfere in this process, by affecting the feeling of being genuine and alienating the subject from his own desire. Thus a study is done on what is a virtual object, its characteristics and to which type of object relationship he refers.

The author seeks to reflect on some of the consequences that the globalization process might bring to the contemporary man and for psychoanalysis. Considering the higher frequency and the range of pathological phenomena determined by psychical suffering, the author critically questions the results of such changes for mankind. Supported by the concept of the " ego ideal ", the paper tries to underline the narcissistic nature of modern times, once defined as "the culture of narcissism" or as "the image era". It stresses that this "project" has the purpose of overcoming the "castration anxiety" and of defensively replacing the limitations imposed by the frustrating nature of human experience. The author emphasizes that these defence mechanisms are already a part of the knowledge brought by psychoanalysis to the understanding of the human singularities. On the theoretical level they do not represent a new challenge. He points out that psychoanalysts are familiar with the use of regression to the narcissistic economy and omnipotence as attempted alternatives to the "castration anxiety". Finally, he emphasizes that any human project supported by such regressions can only lead to failure, causing enormous suffering and a strong tendency to sickness, both psychically and physically.

The author discusses resistances to psychoanalysis. At the outset, the resistances originates from the contemporaneity, and, later, the way that psychoanalysis resists to itself.
The author doesn't believe that the demand for new concepts is a distinctive trait of our days, and outlines the risks of the exigency for efficacy and immediate results for the application of the psychoanalytic method; he studies the conception of pain as deviation; and concludes the presentation with a brief reflection about the psychoanalytic clinic, taking the paradox as the most suitable of this discourse.

The writing of this work is presented, as a psychoanalysis session, including the authors' free associations and reveries. These day-dreams and free associations derive from the clinical facts of a session and from a Bion's theoric statement.
The emerging elements refer to pleasure, memory and to the feeling of loneliness.

Based upon the treatment of two elderly male patients, the late Oedipus complex is discussed, primarily bringing into the fore the role of daughters who have not fully overcome the Oedipus stage.
In respect to single or widow mothers, this paper aims to focus the neurotic relationship that a woman might have with her male child. The behavior they develop in relation to their male children might occur due to incestuous fantasies, which are common to all human beings.
The author attempts to clarify this situation through the study of incest, mythology and history.

Using as reference two texts by Sophocles, Antigone and Oedipus at Colonus, the author examines the probable unconscious motivations of the mythical character Antigone in the choice of her own death. The heroine, condemned by a decree of the tyrant Creon to confinement in a cave where she would die by asphyxia, anticipates her own death committing suicide by hanging herself.
To grasp the character, the author thinks it is necessary to understand the social matrix from which the heroine emerges, the rules of burial ideology in Athens in the 5th century B., the atmosphere that surrounded dramatic representations and the functions of the drama related to the political constitution of 'pólis'.
Considering the paradigm of death of the female in the Greek tragedy: the sacrifice of the virgins and the suicide of the wives, the author understands the events that precede Antigone's suicide and the suicidal act itself as a group of actions that allow her to create a kind of death outside the norms. The heroine, through the use of a 'thanatic zone' different from that used by the virgins, the nape (aukhén) instead of the throat (dére), assures her progression towards a more developed feminine attitude, fantastically acquiring the peculiar status of the wives. Breaking the tragic norm by which the virgins do not kill themselves but are killed, she assumes the authorship of her destiny, incriminates Creon as the executioner of her condemnation and gratifies the urges of her incestuous longing, finding, post-mortem, the renegade femininity and sexual maturity.

"Should training analysis be maintained?" This question, made by Elias Rocha Barros, the chair of IPA Training Congress of 2001 is used by the author as a point of departure to expose his ideas on the subject.
The paper is composed of three parts. In the first one a survey is made of the most important critiques on training analysis; in the second part the structural functioning of training analysis is studied; and in the third part, the author presents two hypotheses trying to explain why training analysis is still maintained.
Training analysis is then described as a fetiche and an ideological formation. As a fetiche it is used by analysts to refuse the limitations of analysis tout-court; and as an ideological formation it functions as a means to hide its symptomatic character making it look "natural" through the functioning of institutional prescriptions.
The author thus says no to the initial question and he even proposes that any and all differentiated form of analysis should be banished and that responsibility for the analysis shoud be left to those who are analyzed. This would be an initial measure in helping to eliminate the ideological mode of functioning of the Institution.

The author intends to demonstrate that the role of the didactic analyst has been harmful to psychoanalytic societies. This is not due to inadequacy or incompetence. In general didactic analysts are chosen among the best in each society. There is, however, an intrinsic contradiction between the role of the psychoanalyst and the work of a didactic analyst who, as the term itself implies, must teach. The analyst, as analyst, can be neither teacher nor judge. His aim is to let the patient express himself, as freely as possible, on all his affectionate and aggressive aspects without needing to please a teacher who is judging him. Therefore, it is important for the one being analyzed to be able to disagree with the analyst on all theoretical and practical aspects of life.
A successful analysis is the one in which the one being analyzed feels free to be what he is knowing that the analyst allows him the freedom to be so. The analyst who communicates his doctrinal concepts to the ones he analyses has stopped being an analyst to become a teacher. This is the role of the professors in charge of theoretical courses and of the supervisors who guide the student's clinical work, but even then the student should be respected and allowed to hold opinions different from those of his instructors. As there is no square triangle there should be no didactic analyst.